MAKAR ALA ISLAM
Posted: Tue Oct 18, 2005 4:16 pm
Islam merencanakan kekhalifahan di muka bumi.
PIAGAM RAMADHAN 1425 H
HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia bersama kaum Muslim menyatakan:
1. Sistem Pemerintahan yang diridhai dan diwajibkan Allah atas kaum Muslim adalah Sistem Khilafah, bukan sistem yang lainnya.
2. Konstitusi yang diwajibkan Allah atas kaum Muslim adalah konstitusi yang digali dari Al-Quran, As-Sunnah, Ijma’ Sahabat, dan Qiyas Syar’iy; bukan konstitusi buatan manusia seperti yang ada saat ini.
3. Kami berjanji kepada Allah, Rasul-Nya, dan kaum Muslim untuk mengerahkan segenap upaya, secara damai, demi tegaknya Khilafah Rasyidah dan Syariah. Kami memohon dengan sungguh-sungguh kepada Allah di bulan yang mulia, bulan Ramadhan Mubarak ini, agar menetapkan kami untuk mewujudkan hal ini, sehingga kaum Muslim merasakan apa yang digambarkan Allah dalam firman-Nya:
[وَيَوْمَئِذٍ يَفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ۞بِنَصْرِ اللهِ يَنْصُرُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الرَّحِيمُ]
…Dan di hari (kemenangan) itu bergembiralah orang-orang yang beriman, karena pertolongan Allah. Dia menolong siapa yang dikehendaki-Nya. Dan Dialah Yang Maha Perkasa lagi Maha Penyayang. (TQS. Ar-Ruum [30]: 4-5)
Jakarta, 24 Oktober 2004 M
10 Ramadhan 1425 H
HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA
Dan Kaum Muslim Yang Mendukungnya
BAGAIMANA CARANYA?
Ini dia........
Management of Barbarian. (quoted from The JamesTown Foundation -
jamestown.org)
Published by the Center of Islamic Studies and Research (an al-Qaeda
affiliate), the 113-page work ‘Management of Barbarism' aims to map out
the progressive stages of establishing an Islamic state, from early
beginnings in defined areas in the Arabian Peninsula, or Nigeria,
Jordan, the Maghreb, Pakistan or Yemen, and its subsequent global
expansion. The author is Abu Bakr Naji, a name familiar from his
contributions to the Sawt al-Jihad online magazine (which are
republished at the end of this book).
By "Management of Barbarism" the author refers to the period just after
the collapse of a superpower, the period of "savage chaos". It appears
pointedly to be a method of not repeating the experience of Afghanistan
prior to the rule of the Taliban, and of improving controls over the
periods experienced, for instance, in Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre.
Contents
After ample prolegomena on Middle East history and the causes of the
rise and fall of superpowers, the book substantially falls into five
broad themes:
1) Definition of ‘Management of Barbarism'
2) The Path of Empowerment
3) The Most Important Principles and Policies
4) The Most Pressing Difficulties and Obstacles
5) Conclusion – demonstrating jihad as the ideal solution
Jihadi strategy
The ‘Path of Empowerment' theme constitutes the strategy of the
mujahideen. In this the author further sub-divides into three distinct
phases:
1) The Disruption and Exhaustion phase
2) The Management of Barbarism phase
3) The Empowerment phase
In the first "Disruption and Exhaustion" phase, the mujahideen are to a)
exhaust the enemy's forces by stretching them through dispersal of
targets and b) "attract the youth through exemplary targeting such as
occurred at Bali, Al-Muhayya and Djerba."
At the "Management of Barbarism phase", the mujahideen are to "establish
internal security, ensure food and medical supplies, defend the zone
from external attack, establish Shari'ah justice, an armed force, an
intelligence service, provide economic sufficiency, defend against
[public] hypocrisy and deviant opinions and ensure obedience, and the
establishment of alliances with neighboring elements that are yet to
give total conformity to the Management, and improve management structures."
The "Empowerment" phase is an extension of the above. The policy is to
continue Disruption and Exhaustion activities, at the same time
establishing logistic links with the various Management zones. A
conspicuous example of this phase is the series of events leading up to
the September 11 attacks on the United States, which "destroyed the
peoples' awe of America and of the lesser ranking Apostate armies." The
fall of Afghanistan, the author explains, was either planned to happen,
or was due to happen even without the September 11 events, and had as
the result the multiplication of jihadi groups bent on revenge.
As for future targeting, this should be variegated "in all parts of the
Islamic world and beyond it. For instance, in striking at tourist
resorts frequented by Crusaders, all tourist resorts will have to be
secured," with all the dispersal of energy and costs this involves. The
same goes for Crusader banks in Turkey employing interest, or petrol
installations near Aden, which will subsequently oblige security hikes
for refineries, pipelines and shipping. "If two apostate authors are
simultaneously liquidated in two different countries, it will require
the security for thousands of writers in the Islamic world."
An important feature of this phase is the attention to be given to media
and propaganda strategy, both for winning support and recruitment, and
for deterring opposition. The media strategy should ‘target in depth
middle ranking officers in the armed forces [of Muslim nations] to push
them to join the jihad.' It should ‘aim at every stage to justify
operations to the populous legally and intellectually … given that,
assuming that our long struggle will require half a million mujahideen,
getting such a number from a nation of millions is easier than from the
ranks of the Islamic movement.'
Jihadi Tactics
The third theme, "The Most Important Principles and Policies," gives
details on tactics. After discussing the necessity of establishing a
proper chain of command, in both the doctrinal and military fields, the
author outlines important military principles ("striking with the
heaviest force at the weakest point; a superior enemy is defeated by
economic and military attrition"). He further suggests four major
reference sources: "The Encyclopedia of Jihad (prepared by the
mujahideen in Afghanistan); the al-Battar magazine; the writings of Abu
Ubayd al-Qurashi in the al-Ansar magazine, along with other works on the
al-Uswa website; general works on military science, particularly on
guerrilla warfare, provided the student rectifies the errors in them
respective to Islamic law."
In the sub-section "The Application of Vehemence" subtitled "The Policy
of Paying the Price," Abu Bakr Naji warns against the dangers of
anything other than maximum violence as a deterrent, or as a response,
even if the response should take years. The response, the author states,
"is best done by other groups and in other countries than those
suffering the act of enmity … to give the enemy the sense of being
surrounded and his interests exposed … and to confuse him." An example
of this method would be, say, in response to the Egyptians' imprisonment
of mujahideen, an attack by mujahideen upon an Egyptian embassy in the
Arabian Peninsula or the Maghreb, or the kidnapping of Egyptian
diplomats, who should be "liquidated horrifically" if the mujahideen's
demands are not met.
Stress is then laid upon the need to understand how international
politics work. In the sub-section "Understanding the Rules of the
Political Game" Abu Bakr Naji highlights how mujahid groups that refused
to soil their hands with profane political calculations paid the price.
The difficulty of reconciling Islamic legal propriety with pragmatic
military interest is resolved, in the author's eyes, by recourse to the
example set by [the 14th century jurist] Ibn Qayyim, who set Prophetic
precedent as a preference, but not an obligation.
An important feature of this game, Naji illustrates, is the manipulation
of the international media, and ensuring that the message gets through
to the target, in its widest sense, and not just to the minority elite.
"We must therefore set up an association whose purpose is to ensure the
communication of our demands to people, even if this should expose them
to dangers akin to the perils of combat … such as the taking of a
hostage. After raising the hullabaloo concerning him we demand that
media correspondents publish our demands in full in return for his
release … Our demand might be a statement of warning or justification
for an operation." An effective response to government media's
demonization of mujahid actions is to prepare the ground by first
demonizing the target as something Islamically forbidden or serving the
economic interests of the enemy. Naji then gives an imaginary scenario
of an attempt to adjust oil prices in favor of the people where a
deadline is issued and an oil engineer or manager or journalist is
kidnapped to ensure that the demand is fully publicized.
Points of weakness
The fourth major theme in the work covers "The Most Pressing
Difficulties and Obstacles" that will face the mujahideen. These are
listed as the diminution in the numbers of believers as casualties in
war, the lack of sufficiently trained administrators (and the relative
social distance many of these have from the rank and file) and the
problems caused by over-enthusiasm in the behavior of some. Naji also
highlights the problems that will be faced with old loyalties to other
Islamist groups impeding administration in the new Management phases, or
the threat of schism.
PIAGAM RAMADHAN 1425 H
HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia bersama kaum Muslim menyatakan:
1. Sistem Pemerintahan yang diridhai dan diwajibkan Allah atas kaum Muslim adalah Sistem Khilafah, bukan sistem yang lainnya.
2. Konstitusi yang diwajibkan Allah atas kaum Muslim adalah konstitusi yang digali dari Al-Quran, As-Sunnah, Ijma’ Sahabat, dan Qiyas Syar’iy; bukan konstitusi buatan manusia seperti yang ada saat ini.
3. Kami berjanji kepada Allah, Rasul-Nya, dan kaum Muslim untuk mengerahkan segenap upaya, secara damai, demi tegaknya Khilafah Rasyidah dan Syariah. Kami memohon dengan sungguh-sungguh kepada Allah di bulan yang mulia, bulan Ramadhan Mubarak ini, agar menetapkan kami untuk mewujudkan hal ini, sehingga kaum Muslim merasakan apa yang digambarkan Allah dalam firman-Nya:
[وَيَوْمَئِذٍ يَفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ۞بِنَصْرِ اللهِ يَنْصُرُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الرَّحِيمُ]
…Dan di hari (kemenangan) itu bergembiralah orang-orang yang beriman, karena pertolongan Allah. Dia menolong siapa yang dikehendaki-Nya. Dan Dialah Yang Maha Perkasa lagi Maha Penyayang. (TQS. Ar-Ruum [30]: 4-5)
Jakarta, 24 Oktober 2004 M
10 Ramadhan 1425 H
HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA
Dan Kaum Muslim Yang Mendukungnya
BAGAIMANA CARANYA?
Ini dia........
Management of Barbarian. (quoted from The JamesTown Foundation -
jamestown.org)
Published by the Center of Islamic Studies and Research (an al-Qaeda
affiliate), the 113-page work ‘Management of Barbarism' aims to map out
the progressive stages of establishing an Islamic state, from early
beginnings in defined areas in the Arabian Peninsula, or Nigeria,
Jordan, the Maghreb, Pakistan or Yemen, and its subsequent global
expansion. The author is Abu Bakr Naji, a name familiar from his
contributions to the Sawt al-Jihad online magazine (which are
republished at the end of this book).
By "Management of Barbarism" the author refers to the period just after
the collapse of a superpower, the period of "savage chaos". It appears
pointedly to be a method of not repeating the experience of Afghanistan
prior to the rule of the Taliban, and of improving controls over the
periods experienced, for instance, in Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre.
Contents
After ample prolegomena on Middle East history and the causes of the
rise and fall of superpowers, the book substantially falls into five
broad themes:
1) Definition of ‘Management of Barbarism'
2) The Path of Empowerment
3) The Most Important Principles and Policies
4) The Most Pressing Difficulties and Obstacles
5) Conclusion – demonstrating jihad as the ideal solution
Jihadi strategy
The ‘Path of Empowerment' theme constitutes the strategy of the
mujahideen. In this the author further sub-divides into three distinct
phases:
1) The Disruption and Exhaustion phase
2) The Management of Barbarism phase
3) The Empowerment phase
In the first "Disruption and Exhaustion" phase, the mujahideen are to a)
exhaust the enemy's forces by stretching them through dispersal of
targets and b) "attract the youth through exemplary targeting such as
occurred at Bali, Al-Muhayya and Djerba."
At the "Management of Barbarism phase", the mujahideen are to "establish
internal security, ensure food and medical supplies, defend the zone
from external attack, establish Shari'ah justice, an armed force, an
intelligence service, provide economic sufficiency, defend against
[public] hypocrisy and deviant opinions and ensure obedience, and the
establishment of alliances with neighboring elements that are yet to
give total conformity to the Management, and improve management structures."
The "Empowerment" phase is an extension of the above. The policy is to
continue Disruption and Exhaustion activities, at the same time
establishing logistic links with the various Management zones. A
conspicuous example of this phase is the series of events leading up to
the September 11 attacks on the United States, which "destroyed the
peoples' awe of America and of the lesser ranking Apostate armies." The
fall of Afghanistan, the author explains, was either planned to happen,
or was due to happen even without the September 11 events, and had as
the result the multiplication of jihadi groups bent on revenge.
As for future targeting, this should be variegated "in all parts of the
Islamic world and beyond it. For instance, in striking at tourist
resorts frequented by Crusaders, all tourist resorts will have to be
secured," with all the dispersal of energy and costs this involves. The
same goes for Crusader banks in Turkey employing interest, or petrol
installations near Aden, which will subsequently oblige security hikes
for refineries, pipelines and shipping. "If two apostate authors are
simultaneously liquidated in two different countries, it will require
the security for thousands of writers in the Islamic world."
An important feature of this phase is the attention to be given to media
and propaganda strategy, both for winning support and recruitment, and
for deterring opposition. The media strategy should ‘target in depth
middle ranking officers in the armed forces [of Muslim nations] to push
them to join the jihad.' It should ‘aim at every stage to justify
operations to the populous legally and intellectually … given that,
assuming that our long struggle will require half a million mujahideen,
getting such a number from a nation of millions is easier than from the
ranks of the Islamic movement.'
Jihadi Tactics
The third theme, "The Most Important Principles and Policies," gives
details on tactics. After discussing the necessity of establishing a
proper chain of command, in both the doctrinal and military fields, the
author outlines important military principles ("striking with the
heaviest force at the weakest point; a superior enemy is defeated by
economic and military attrition"). He further suggests four major
reference sources: "The Encyclopedia of Jihad (prepared by the
mujahideen in Afghanistan); the al-Battar magazine; the writings of Abu
Ubayd al-Qurashi in the al-Ansar magazine, along with other works on the
al-Uswa website; general works on military science, particularly on
guerrilla warfare, provided the student rectifies the errors in them
respective to Islamic law."
In the sub-section "The Application of Vehemence" subtitled "The Policy
of Paying the Price," Abu Bakr Naji warns against the dangers of
anything other than maximum violence as a deterrent, or as a response,
even if the response should take years. The response, the author states,
"is best done by other groups and in other countries than those
suffering the act of enmity … to give the enemy the sense of being
surrounded and his interests exposed … and to confuse him." An example
of this method would be, say, in response to the Egyptians' imprisonment
of mujahideen, an attack by mujahideen upon an Egyptian embassy in the
Arabian Peninsula or the Maghreb, or the kidnapping of Egyptian
diplomats, who should be "liquidated horrifically" if the mujahideen's
demands are not met.
Stress is then laid upon the need to understand how international
politics work. In the sub-section "Understanding the Rules of the
Political Game" Abu Bakr Naji highlights how mujahid groups that refused
to soil their hands with profane political calculations paid the price.
The difficulty of reconciling Islamic legal propriety with pragmatic
military interest is resolved, in the author's eyes, by recourse to the
example set by [the 14th century jurist] Ibn Qayyim, who set Prophetic
precedent as a preference, but not an obligation.
An important feature of this game, Naji illustrates, is the manipulation
of the international media, and ensuring that the message gets through
to the target, in its widest sense, and not just to the minority elite.
"We must therefore set up an association whose purpose is to ensure the
communication of our demands to people, even if this should expose them
to dangers akin to the perils of combat … such as the taking of a
hostage. After raising the hullabaloo concerning him we demand that
media correspondents publish our demands in full in return for his
release … Our demand might be a statement of warning or justification
for an operation." An effective response to government media's
demonization of mujahid actions is to prepare the ground by first
demonizing the target as something Islamically forbidden or serving the
economic interests of the enemy. Naji then gives an imaginary scenario
of an attempt to adjust oil prices in favor of the people where a
deadline is issued and an oil engineer or manager or journalist is
kidnapped to ensure that the demand is fully publicized.
Points of weakness
The fourth major theme in the work covers "The Most Pressing
Difficulties and Obstacles" that will face the mujahideen. These are
listed as the diminution in the numbers of believers as casualties in
war, the lack of sufficiently trained administrators (and the relative
social distance many of these have from the rank and file) and the
problems caused by over-enthusiasm in the behavior of some. Naji also
highlights the problems that will be faced with old loyalties to other
Islamist groups impeding administration in the new Management phases, or
the threat of schism.